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Arms Control Agreement:
An Important Step Toward Peace and Long-Term
Stabilisation in the Region of Southeastern Europe
Dorko Bekic
1. Introduction
After the declaration of national sovereignty and
independence, in June 1991, the Croatian state found itself
in the centre of international political events without an
adequate defence capability and an appropriate state
apparatus, motivated exclusively by patriotism and the
determination of the people to defend themselves, relying
on their own resources, outside the existing international
economic-political and defence groupings and
arrangements.
Immediately afterwards, the Republic of Croatia was
exposed to the internal rebellion of the "fifth column",
which served as an introduction to undeclared aggressive
war, aimed at the overthrow of the democratically elected
authorities and at the secession of a large part of the
national territory.
It was against this background that Croatia was forced,
during the succeeding four years, to wage a defensive war
with a two-fold objective: on the one hand, to defend the
results of the free, democratic elections in the spring of
1990, while, on the other, the defence effort was directed
at re-establishing territorial integrity. In fighting for these
basic national interests, the Croatian state and its people
were, at the same time, defending the fundamental values
ofthe free world and of the international community. At a
diplomatic level, combining the struggle for national
interests with the interests of the democratic world, the
Republic of Croatia was able successfully to defend both,
in spite of numerous unfavourable domestic and external
circumstances, and to assert itself as a respected subject of
international relations and member of the world
community.
In December 1995, after three weeks of negotiation
in Dayton, USA, a peace agreement was signed in Paris, in
the presence of the highest representatives of the
international community and of the great powers. Formally
viewed, the Agreement relates to Bosnia and Herzegovina,
but it also marked thede/acto end of undeclared aggression
against the Republic of Croatia. This agreement affirms,
among other things, the crucial role of the Republic of
Croatia in the implementation of the peace process and
as a factor of overall, long-term stabilisatiorrof conditions
in South-eastern Europe.
The military part of the Dayton Peace Agreement is
comprised in Annexes lA and IE. The latter document
contains provisions on three obligatory rounds of military
negotiations between the Parties to the Dayton Agreement.
Article II of Annex IB provides for the signing of an
Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures and Security
on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Article IV calls
for negotiations on subregional stabilisation, that is, on the
control and reduction of armaments, while Article V
provides for talks aimed at an agreement on broader
regional arms control. Article III should also be mentioned
in this context; it specifies that, after the successful
conclusion of negotiations on the control and reduction of
armaments, the arms embargo on the import of weapons,
imposed by UN in 1991 on all the parties involved in the
conflict on the territory of the former Yugoslavia should
be lifted.
So far, and in accordance with the adopted timetable,
talks have been successfully conducted and appropriate
agreements signed on Articles II and IV of Annex IE.
Under Article IV, the Republic of Croatia, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
Republika Srpska, are required, under the sponsorship of
the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe,
to conclude a separate Agreement on the control and
reduction of five categories of armaments within 180 days
after the signing of the Dayton Agreement and to
voluntarily limit the number of personnel in their armed
forces.
In this, the international community, with the US as
the chief initiator and sponsor of the Dayton Accords, were
guided by two main motives:
- firstly, the agreement on the control and reduction
of weapons was conceived as the military component added
to the political and civilian aspects, in order to prevent as
effectively as possible the renewed outbreak of war, and
to ensure comprehensive and long-term military-political
stabilisation on the territory of the former Yugoslavia;
- secondly, the US and the other member-countries
of the Contact Group wanted to use Annex IB to extend
over the region of Southeast Europe the same criteria of
military security and the same confidence-building
measures accepted by the countries signatories of the
Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe as early as 1990.
It should be remembered here that this Treaty was not
signed only by the non-aligned and neutral countries in
Europe, which means, in this part of the Continent, by the
former Yugoslavia, Austria and Albania.
Although the "philosophy", and even the concrete
solutions for the control and reduction of armaments, set
forth in Annex IB are derived from the mentioned CFE
Treaty, it is still also true that this section of the Dayton
Agreement represented a precedent in military-diplomatic
history. It has, namely, never been happened before that
warring parties or, more precisely, aggressors and their
victims, should start talks about the control and reduction
of arms directly after concluding a peace agreement. If we
take into account, in addition to this, the still unsettled
mutual relations (the problems of peaceful reintegration
of the Croatian part of the Danube valley, the recognition
of the Republic of Croatia by the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, the problem of refugees, of succession,
punishment of war crimes, reparation for war damage, the
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Law on Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc.), the great
mistrust among the parties to the negotiations, as well as
the differences of view and of interests among the great
powers, members of the Contact Group, it will not be
difficult to conclude that this was an exceptionally difficult
and complex military-diplomatic undertaking.
2.Major conceptuall weaknesses
Regardless of these circumstances, the basic position
of the Croatian leadership and Government have not
changed in the post-war period: the view is still upheld that
interests of the Croatian people and state cannot be
promoted irrespective of, or against, the interests of the
international community, and that, instead, such platforms
and diplomatic stances should be sought at all times that
will enable the adjustment of national interests with those
of the international community. This was also the position
taken by the Croatian leadership and diplomats with regard
to the implementation of all sections of the Dayton
Agreement.
Diplomatic activity on the military aspect of the
Agreement, contained in Annexes lA and 1B, started with
the preparatory meeting at Petersburg near Bonn in
December 1995, at which the modalities of the negotiations
were set. The chief negotiator, in the capacity of Special
Representative to the OSCE Chairman, was found in the
person of the Norwegian General Vigleik Eide, who
convened the first meeting for January 4,1996, at the OSCE
headquarters in Vienna.
Certain conceptual weaknesses and shortcomings of
the provisions of Annex 1B became apparent from the
outset. The most serious among them was found in the
Preamble, which speaks of the equitable participation of
three recognized, sovereign states, but also of two entities
comprising Bosnia and Herzegovina, who had no right to
act as subjects of international law. In negotiations which
are international by character such a state of affairs was
awkward indeed.
Another weakness was involved in the provision which
stated that - if the parties did not agree otherwise by a
certain time - only one criterion would be applied to the
ratio of military forces: the relative ratio of the populations
of FR Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina,
which was 5:2:2. In addition, article IV of Annex 1B
specified that, out of the reported numbers for each of the
five categories of weapons, FR Yugoslavia could keep 75
percent, and Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 30
percent each. Within Bosnia and Herzegovina, the military
holdings subject to limitation of all five types are to be
divided between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the Republika Srpska according to the 2:1 ratio. By
pre-determining thus the end result of the negotiations,
the architects of the Framework Agreement made sure
that, irrespective of the views and interests of the
negotiating parties, the talks would take a "happy" ending.
But, at the same time, this gave the chance to any party
which would benefit under the 5:2:2 arrangement to delay
the talks until the end of the 180 period, when the provision
specifying this ratio was to come automatically into force.
The analyses by the Croatian delegation revealed that
Article IV of Annex IB did not set out in detail who would
verify the data on the five weapon categories reported by
FRY, to be used as the baseline for the 5:2:2 ratio, and
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how this would be done. Furthermore, on the eve of the
talks it was still unclear who would supervise the reduction
process and what methods would be employed, although
the successful implementation of the Agreement could
hardly be expected without firm guarantees and a well-
defined procedure. The provisions dealing with artillery
weapons created additional difficulties by requiring the
negotiating parties to go beyond the CFE Treaty (which
only covers equipment over 100 millimeters) and to reduce
all artillery weapons above 75 mm. After careful analysis,
the Croatian delegation concluded that the laconic
formulation from that provision, which defines artillery as
"all weapons above 75 mm", was absolute nonsense from
a technical point of view. According to this formulation,
namely, the term artillery would include also 82 mm
mortars, which are not artillery pieces and are not to be
found in artillery but in infantry units. The same could be
said of rifle grenade launchers, ground-to-ground rockets
(e.g. "Luna"), recoilless guns and hand-operated rocket
launchers. The last two are, in fact, anti-tank weapons with
direct, not indirect, fire power. Lastly, because of the great
variety of weapons in the existing arsenals of the parties to
the conflict, it was difficult to find appropriate definitions
of types of armament, especially with regard to combat
aircraft and attack helicopters.
If the "philosophy" of the Vienna talks was inspired
by the said CFE Treaty, the conduct of the talks greatly
resembled those in Dayton. The negotiating parties were,
namely, handed the drafts of the basic agreement and of
the accessory protocols by the Chairman or, more precisely,
by the team of experts from the Contact Group. These
were then discussed in detail, paragraph by paragraph.
The first stage of the talks was marked by extremely
restrictive negotiating tactics of the FRY delegation, which
opposed most provisions in the draft agreement by simply
having them "placed into brackets".
At the same time, all negotiating parties were required
to prepare, within a month's time, reports on their holdings
for five types of equipment: tanks, armoured combat
vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters.
It hardly needs to be stressed that the first reports were
subjected to the criticism and suspicion of the other parties.
The Croatian delegation insisted on the verification of all
the reports submitted, so as to ensure that the talks were
conducted on the basis of real, not distorted, data.
In doing this, the Croatian delegation had two motives:
on the one hand, for the sake of meaningful and efficient
negotiations, it insisted on genuine information about the
holdings of all parties, aware that its own report on holdings
was accurate and complete but that the reports of some
parties were, to put it mildly, incomplete. At a higher level
of analysis, the Croatian delegation came to the conclusion
that so-called transparency, i.e., openness, of all military
structures in Southeast Europe to international control
would constitute the most important by-product of
negotiations on subregional stabilisation. This view, it
should not be denied, was based on the awareness that the
FRY Army, which grew out of the former JNA, was the
most conservative and the most tightly closed army
structure in Europe, and thus a permanent source of
instability, in the region and beyond it. Proceeding from
this, we concluded that the "unlocking" of the structures
of the Yugoslav Army by means of "on-the-spot
verification" (our proposal was that it should be conducted
APRIL - JUNE 1996
with the participation of international military experts, i.e.,
NATO and WEU personnel) would represent the first step
in its future democratic transformation, and thereby also
in transcending its autarchic and conservative character,
and, consequently, its "built -in" propensity for aggression.
3. The position of Croatia
However, in view of the rigid position of the FRY and
RS delegations, the Chairman of the talks, together with
the experts from the Contact Group, considered that
negotiating on the modalities of verification, to be followed
by on-the-spot implementation, would take too much time
and would put to risk the deadline for the negotiations,
which the Dayton Agreement had set for June 6. Even
though fully endorsing the Croatian arguments in informal
consultations, they seemed primarily interested in "getting
the job done", and pressured the Croatian delegation to
withdraw its demand for verification of the reported
holdings. Not wishing to be accused of obstructing the talks,
the Croatian delegation then gave up its absolutely justified
proposal. However, it insisted on a candid and argumented
discussion with the aim of agreeing on new, so-called
"corrected", reports on holdings. This suggestion was
accepted.
In this "cleaning-up" work, it soon became apparent
that, in addition to deliberate concealment of the real
numbers, data about some categories of arms were
misrepresented also because of the great diversity of
existing types. After the clarification of the ambiguous
points and the recategorisation of some types of weapons
(in which, e.g., the Croatian delegation corrected its report
on attack helicopters), modified reports were then
submitted. The Croatian delegation again disputed the
accuracy of the data reported by the FRY delegation, but
agreed to continue the talks on the basis of the reported
figures. on the condition that new, appropriately verified,
reports would be sent as part of the implementation of the
Agreement.
Further negotiating efforts of the Croatian delegation
were directed at the most sensitive issue, i.e., the adoption
of such ratios in different categories of armaments that
would not be derived exclusively by mechanically
correlating the submitted, incomplete, reports on holdings
and the relative population figures but would take into
account as much as possible the objective defence needs
of the Republic of Croatia and of its defence strategy. As
already explained, this aim was difficult to reach since,
according to the pre-set rules of the talks, the party - or
parties -who stood to benefit by the 5:2:2 ratio could simply
drag out the talks, waiting for the l80-day period to expire
and for the ratio to come into effect automatically. With
this handicap in mind, the Croatian delegation invested
maximum negotiating effort into obtaining approval for
such numbers in all categories of weapons as would meet
the legitimate defence needs of the Republic of Croatia
and also formally satisfy the 5:2:2 ratio. For this purpose,
already in the first stage of negotiations, the Croatian
delegation presented its data (augmented by the customary
"negotiating margin") and clearly stated that these reflected
the country's defence needs. In the beginning, these figures
caused some consternation, especially among the military
experts of the Contact Group, but, since they were
presented early on, with the porgies of the talks, the other
negotiating parties became used to them and started to
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come out with numbers of their own, so that, in the end,
the final figures were more favourable to Croatia than the
original Dayton formula.
The last stage of the negotiations was devoted to the
adjustment of positions on the modalities of inspection and
verification, that is, to the methods and dates for the
reduction, i.e., removal, of the "surplus" weaponry.
The hardest nut to crack in this part of the talks were
the definitions of the subjects, objects and sites of
inspection. The delegations of FRY and RS vigorously
opposed any participation of international factors in the
implementation of the Agreement or, more precisely, in
the inspection of their armed forces. Arguing that their
country was not an OSCE member, the delegation of FR
Yugoslavia disputed any role of that Organisation as
sponsor and co-ordinator of inspection and reduction, and
was particularly adamant against the presence of
international military experts, officers of NATO and WEU,
in the inspection teams which the parties to the Agreement
were to send to each other's inspections sites in order to
verify on the spot the implementation of the Agreement.
In the end, it was still agreed that each party had the right
to include in its inspection team, if it so wishes, "up to three
assistants", i.e., foreign military experts. This solution was
found satisfactory by the Croatian delegation since, in
principle, it allows for the conduct of such international
inspection and verification of the FRY armed forces, which
is undoubtedly a historic precedent for this, as we called it,
most tightly shut military structure in Europe.
With regard to the objects and sites of inspection, the
Croatian delegation was successful in its efforts to reject
the restrictive provisions under which only declared
weapons and military units, or barracks and storage sites,
could be verified. Instead, formulations were adopted
allowing the inspection of any space (so-called "undeclared
site") which might contain equipment subject to control
and limitation.
The modalities of the reduction of "surplus" weapons
proved, somewhat unexpectedly, as the hardest negotiating
issue, specially in respect to the delegations of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Federation, on one side, and
Republika Srpska and FR Yugoslavia, on the other. For
example, during the last days of the Vienna talks, in early
June, the delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was even
prepared to agree to less favourable solutions on the status
of the negotiating parties as subjects of international law,
which was from the outset regarded as the toughest
problem implied in Article IV of Annex 1B, in return for
more convenient deadlines and forms of reduction.
4. Pressure and deadlock
In the midst of the hectic atmosphere and time
pressure of the last two days (and nights) of the
negotiations, the Croatian delegation once more played a
constructive part and demonstrated its negotiating skills.
It proposed, namely, a "package-solution" for the three
thorniest issues, which comprised precise numbers and
ratios for individual weapon categories, specified a 16-
month period for the reduction of the "surplus" arms, and
offered a definition of the status of the parties that made it
clear that they represented three states and two entities,
all of whom were named as "parties" and had equal rights
and obligations, but who possessed different levels of
statehood, especially as subjects of international law. Out
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of this "Croatian package", agreement was reached in
Vienna with respect to numbers and periods of reduction,
but differences of view remained as regards the status of
the parties.
In spite of the fact that the text of the Agreement had
not been fully approved, the high delegations of all parties
to the negotiations departed for Oslo, where the signing
ceremony of the Agreement had been scheduled for June
11. However, even in Oslo, after two days and nights of
negotiations at ministerial level, the positions of the
Bosnian side and of the RS delegation could still not be
reconciled. In the face of this deadlock, in the night between
June 11 and 12, the Croatian delegation proposed to "stop
the clock", which is a well-known diplomatic expedient
formally to observe the deadline for an agreement. With
the clock thus "stopped", it was decided to transfer the
signing of the Agreement to Florence. Namely, by
coincidence, the Review Conference of the Contact Group
and of the signatories of the Dayton Agreement was to be
convened in Florence on June 14, to consider the results
of its implementation and the role played in this by each
party.
Additional pressure was then brought to bear in
Florence on the parties who resisted signing the document,
and it was finally signed on June 14, with only minor
"cosmetic" changes to the formulations suggested by the
Croatian delegation in Vienna.
Briefly, the Agreement on Subregional Arms Control
limits the holdings of the FRY Army to 1025 tanks, 850
armoured personnel carriers, 3750 artillery pieces, 155
combat aircraft and 53 attack helicopters. The Republic
of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are each entitled
to 450 tanks, 340 armoured vehicles, 1500 artillery pieces,
62 combat aircraft and 21 attack helicopters.
The figures for the FRY Army signify, in fact, a
considerable reduction of its holdings for all the five
categories of weapons, while the Republic of Croatia will
only have to reduce the number of artillery pieces - from
2173 to 1500. At the same time, the Croatian Army will be
able to increase the number of its tanks from 284 to 450,
and its armoured personnel carriers from 128 to as many
as 340vehicles. Besides, in addition to its 27 combat aircraft,
Croatia can obtain 35 more, while increasing the number
of its attack helicopters from the present four to 21 units.
Of course, it ought to be mentioned also that, in the course
of the Vienna talks, all the participating parties acted with
an eye to their interests and plans for the modernization
of their military potentials. Thus, it is to be expected that,
in meeting their reduction obligations, i.e., in destroying
or converting their armaments, each side will in effect try
to disencumber itself from obsolete weapons. In the light
of this, it would appear that even the FRY Army, which
had to undertake to reduce the largest part of its holdings,
will actually suffer no great damage.
Moreover, considering the fact that the conclusion of
an arms control agreement was a basic prerequisite for
the lifting of the arms embargo imposed on all the parties,
the Agreement can be regarded as a first step in the
modernization of the military assets of all signatory parties.
In this sense, too, the Agreement again favours Croatia
the most.
The limits for all the five weapon categories that
Croatia was able to negotiate are high enough to enable
practically full modernization of the Croatian Army, leaving
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as the only limiting factor the availability of funds from the
defence budget for the purchase of state-of-the-art combat
aircraft, attack helicopters or combat vehicles and tanks.
The voluntary commitments of all signatory parties
to limit their military manpower was another important
element of the modernization of their potentials but, at
the same time, a major contribution to the easing of tension
and the building of confidence and security. The delegation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared thus that, as of July 1,
1996, the number of its military personnel would be 60,000,
the Republic of Croatia announced the reduction of its
manpower to 65,000, FRY to 124,339, while the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska
undertook to limit their manpower to 55,000 and 56,000
persons respectively.
5. Conclusion
The signing ofthe Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms
Control, however, should be regarded within a broader
context than as merely setting ratios of arms and personnel
to prevail in the different armies existing in this region.
In addition to limiting the five main categories of
offensive weapons, the Agreement introduces other
important stabilisation effects into an area characterized
by substantial military and political insecurity. First of all,
it can be expected that the exchange of military information
and inspection visits will contribute to the building of
confidence and security in military matters, a confidence
which is as yet non-existent. Secondly, as a side-effect of
the implementation of the Agreement, the army structures
of all signatories will inevitably become more open and
transparent, not only in relation to their neighbours but
also to the international community at large. It can be
reasonably expected that such a development of military
and political relations in the region will reduce tensions,
lead to an overall relaxation and normalization of mutual
relations, and help towards long-term stabilisation of the
situation in Southeast Europe.
This favourable trend will be supported by a further
step foreseen by Annex IB of the Dayton Agreement,
whose Article V provides for negotiations about a broader
regional balance of forces, after the conclusion of the Sub-
Regional Agreement, and it is expected that at least
Slovenia, Macedonia and Albania, and perhaps also
Austria, will join the parties to the Agreement of June 14.
These are, namely, the only countries in the region which
have not undertaken any commitments regarding arms
reduction and control. By joining the negotiations on
regional security based on Article V of Annex IB of the
Dayton Agreement, they would be finally integrated into
the complex system of multilateral control and limitation
of armaments, which originated in the Treaty on
Conventional Forces in Europe.
Interest in regional security talks has been shown by
other countries from the broader region who joined the
1990 CFE Treaty: Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania,
Greece and Turkey. Lastly, the big powers, i.e., members
of the Contact Group, have begun preparations for
negotiations under Article V. There is little doubt that these
negotiations, and the resulting agreement, would constitute
an important step towards overall stabilisation of security,
and would thus be a key element in the new European
security "architecture".
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